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PUBLIC LAW
More Disagreement Over Human Dignity: Federal Constitutional Court’s Most Recent Benetton Advertising
Decision
By Craig Smith*

Article 1 is the Basic Law’s crown. The concept of human dignity is this crown’s
jewel: an interest so precious that the state must affirmatively protect and foster its
inviolability. This uniquely important status is evident from human dignity’s
prominence in the constitution, the early Federal Republic’s pressing need to repudiate the Third Reich, the many judicial and scholarly exegeses of Article 1, and
human dignity’s unique claim to absolute protection. The success of the German
legal construct of human dignity also is apparent from its influence on the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. That document likewise begins with
a provision nearly identical to the Basic Law’s Article 1.1
Human dignity is also one of the most elusive concepts in German constitutional
law. It is the “foundation of all fundamental rights,” which in turn collectively are
Konkretisierungen (concretizations or concrete forms) of the Basic Law’s “principle of
human dignity.”2 Elusive concepts offer judges great power because they are sufficiently malleable to mean many different things to well-meaning interpreters. The
malleability of the Basic Law’s human dignity concept has been prominently displayed in recent years. Disagreements over its substantive content have bounced
back and forth in Karlsruhe between two of Germany’s most important courts in
the Benetton Advertising Cases. Twice the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH – Federal Court of
Justice) has discerned a violation of human dignity in a Benetton print advertise-
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ment.3 The ad displayed, above the clothing company’s name in small letters, naked human buttocks stamped with the phrase “H.I.V. POSITIVE.” Twice now,
however, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court) has
overruled its Karlsruhe neighbor.4 It did so most recently on March 11, 2003, holding that Article 1 of the Basic Law does not justify banning the press from distributing an advertiser’s depiction of suffering even though the purpose of that depiction
is to generate commercial profits.
The Federal Court of Justice first upheld prohibition of the Benetton ad and of others like it in 1995. The Court concluded that publication of the ad violated the gute
Sitten (good morals or customs) requirement imposed by the Gesetz gegen den
Unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG – Unfair Competition Act). By depicting persons
infected with the AIDS virus as stamped, stigmatized, and excluded from society,
the Court explained, the ad unlawfully engendered pity among consumers and
exploited this feeling for competitive commercial purposes.5 The ad also would
have to be viewed at least by AIDS sufferers as injurious to human dignity.6
The Federal Constitutional Court’s December 2000 opinion reversed this holding.
The Court remanded the case to the Federal Court of Justice with instructions to
reinterpret the ad using proper conceptions of human dignity and of the freedoms
of expression and the press protected by the Basic Law’s Article 5.7 The judges
were in particular told to view the ad as subject to varying interpretations. They
also were told not to construe Article 5 of the Basic Law as permitting prohibition
of an ad simply because the ad exploits “empathy with grave suffering” for commercial purposes.8 Freedom of the press does not shield ads that violate human
dignity from liability under the Unfair Competition Act, the Court explained.9 The
3
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Federal Court of Justice, however, had improperly overlooked possible interpretations of the ad, and under these interpretations the ad would not violate human
dignity.10 Consequently, banning the ads violated freedom of the press.11
On reconsideration of the case, the Federal Court of Justice again found a violation
of the Unfair Competition Act.12 The Constitutional Court’s decision of December
2000 did not, the Federal Court of Justice reasoned, require judges to rely on factual
evidence regarding how the public actually viewed the ad. To the contrary, the
judges could rely on their general life experience in determining the meaning and
impact of the ad.13 This time, however, the judges concluded that the ad was a
provocation that communicated no particular message.14 The ad instead aimed to
gain viewers’ attention and then left them to interpret and evaluate the ad freely.15
The ad perhaps called for solidarity with suffering human beings, but only cynically; profit was the real motive.16 A vast majority of AIDS sufferers would feel that
the ad minimized or demeaned their human dignity, and this violated their right to
enjoy respect and compassionate solidarity.17 Hence the ad misused a depiction of
suffering: The ad violated human dignity by using such a depiction simply for the
advertiser’s commercial purposes of provoking viewers to gain attention and increase profits.18 In addition, publishing the ad constituted unfair competition because the ad could harass the public, engendering fear of AIDS and unacceptably
confronting persons affected by AIDS with their own suffering in the form of advertising.19 With this revised reasoning, the Federal Court of Justice reinstated the
10
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legal conclusion that the Federal Constitutional Court had rejected in December
2000: publishing the ad violated the Unfair Competition Act’s gute Sitten requirement.
Responding in March 2003, the Federal Constitutional Court first repeated the assertion, from its December 2000 opinion, that the ad fell within the scope or protective realm (Schutzbereich) of press freedom under the Basic Law’s Art. 5(1).20 The ad
cannot, the Court wrote, be reduced to the mere intention to gain attention for the
advertiser.21 The ad instead makes a social problem visible. Therefore, the ad has
opinion-forming content.22
The Federal Constitutional Court then acknowledged that it lacks power to correct
an interpretive error by the Federal Court of Justice unless that error has substantive weight in the case and rests on a fundamentally incorrect view of a basic
right.23 This rule imposes a high threshold the Federal Constitutional Court must
cross before it can reverse a decision of the Court of Justice. Nonetheless, the Federal Constitutional Court concluded that the Federal Court of Justice had again
committed such a grave error, thereby unjustifiably restricting freedom of the
press.24
This time the error lay not, however, in improperly interpreting the ad’s meaning.
To the contrary, the Federal Court of Justice had, as instructed by the Federal Constitutional Court in its December 2000 decision, correctly found that the ad did not
suggest that the advertiser approved of stigmatizing AIDS sufferers. To the contrary, the ad could be understood positively as social criticism.25 Moreover, the
Federal Court of Justice had correctly distinguished this expressive content of the ad
from the advertiser’s expressive purpose – namely, increasing profits by gaining the
public’s attention.26 This purpose forms part of the expression’s context; hence it
20

BVerfG 1 BvR 426/02 of 11 March 2003, Slip Opinion at 16. Art. 5(1) GG states in part: “Everyone
has the right to freely express and disseminate his opinion in speech, writing, and pictures …. Freedom of the press … [is] guaranteed.”
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could indeed affect the ad’s meaning.27 The purpose could not, however, exclude
or contradict the potential social-criticism meaning.28 One cannot conclude, the
Federal Constitutional Court wrote, that the advertiser intended only to gain attention and to profit.29 Rather, this purpose and the critical meaning coexist “side by
side” and without contradiction.30 Consequently, the Federal Court of Justice had
correctly assumed that viewers could regard the ad as expressing a critical opinion.31
The Federal Court of Justice seriously erred, however, by using the ad’s purpose to
establish a violation of human dignity. This use revealed a misinterpretation of the
scope of the limitation on freedom of expression created by Article 1’s humandignity protection.32 The advertisement employs the misery of AIDS sufferers for
commercial purposes, the Federal Constitutional Court conceded.33 Noncommercial depictions of suffering may be morally preferable, the Court added, but they
are not constitutionally required.34 An ad’s content can justify prohibition of the ad
as violative of human dignity under Unfair Competition Act.35 But an ad’s commercial purpose cannot.36 The Federal Court of Justice, the Federal Constitutional
Court concluded, improperly ruled that a profit motive can, by itself, rob an ad’s
message of the constitutionally mandated respect for human beings that the message otherwise possesses, thereby transforming a protected expression into an infringement of the constitution.37
27

Id. at ¶ 24.
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The Federal Constitutional Court also rejected the Federal Court of Justice’s additional reasoning. Protecting the public from Belästigung (harassment) likewise does
not justify prohibiting an ad whose content addresses suffering without violating
human dignity.38
The opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court thus intriguingly seems to assert
that the Basic Law makes the purpose of an advertiser’s expression both relevant
and irrelevant. Attention to the use and timing of this consideration may offer the
best hope of unraveling this apparent paradox: Purpose is initially relevant as context but later irrelevant as a separate consideration. Initially, as the state examines
the expression’s meaning, the advertiser’s purpose may be relevant because it is
context for the expression, and context can affect the expression’s meaning.39 The
meaning must then be determinative, by itself, of whether the expression is compatible with Article 1’s protection of human dignity. Thereafter, however – that is,
once the meaning has been evaluated – the expression’s purpose lacks further relevance. It then cannot, by itself, change the constitutional analysis. Under this interpretation, the Federal Court of Justice’s error lay in regarding the advertiser’s
profit motive as decisive even after the Court had judicially evaluated the Benetton
ad’s meaning.40 The Court failed to distinguish between expressive purpose as
initially relevant context and subsequently irrelevant dross.
How useful such a distinction regarding advertisers’ purposes will prove to be in
future cases is an open and interesting question. Could an advertiser’s purpose
decisively influence the meaning and constitutionality of that advertiser’s expression? Could the state for example use the Unfair Competition Act to prohibit, as
violative of human dignity, an advertisement that, though difficult to interpret,
seems designed to help the advertiser not just profit commercially but also at the
same time exploit and foment racial hatred? This Benetton opinion provides little
help in answering such a question, but the question unfortunately seems not to lie
beyond the realm of possibility.
Finally, the key to the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision may lie in the opinion’s final paragraph. Here the Court explicitly names “reality” as a compelling
reason for judicial restraint in the case: Forbidding commercial advertisements
38

Id. at ¶ 28.

39

Id. at ¶ 24 ( “Because the advertising purpose forms part of the social-criticism message’s context, this
purpose can influence the message’s meaning.”).
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from addressing suffering would leave no place for a substantial portion of today’s
advertising, which is ubiquitous and powerfully influential over people’s views,
values, and opinions.41 The Court did not add that use of commercial law to forbid
widespread and powerful messages might soon overwhelm judges with the task of
closely policing advertising. But little imagination is needed to reach that conclusion. The Court instead simply reminded its readers that expression merits special
protection whenever it addresses society’s problems.

41

Id. at ¶ 29.

